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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
DIANE FAVA:TELLA, by and 
through her Guardian Ad 




JEAN W. POULSEN and 





STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action for personal injuries 
by the Guardian Ad Litem of a seven-year old 
child against the defendant driver of an automobile 
in which the child was riding when injured. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the pre-trial, the lower court denied the 
Motion of the defendant driver, Mary Ellen Carter, 
to dismiss the Compl1aint of the plaintiff against 
her. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant and appellant, Mary Ellen Carter, 
wan ts an Order from this court directing the lower 
court to grant her Motion to dismiss the Complaint 
of the plaintiff against her. 
1 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
On December 2, 1964, this court granted the 
appellant, Mary Ellen Carter's petition for an In-
terlocutory Appeal. (R 25) 
In the Complaint in Civil Case No. 140856, 
the plaintiff alleges that on ,January 7, 1963, she 
was a passenger in an automobile being driven by 
the defendant, Mary Ellen Carter, and at that time 
she was seven years of age. The Complaint does 
not allege wilful misconduct or intoxication on the 
part of the defendant driver, nor does the Com-
plaint allege that the seven-year old plaintiff or 
her pai·ents made payment for the ride. (R 1, 2, 
and 3) 
At the pre-trial, it was stipulated and agreed 
that the minor plaintiff made no payment for the 
ride in question, nor did her parents make any pay-
ment, and that she was riding as a convenience to 
her parents, and that this arrangement was made 
'between the driver and the parents of the minor 
child, and the minor child had no part in making 
the arrangement. (R 9) 
The defendant, Jean W. Poulsen, was the driver 
of a second car involved in the collision. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF IS BARTIED FROM RECOVERY 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, 
MARY ELLEN CARTER, BECAUSE AT THE TIME 
OF THE INJURY, THE PLAINTIFF WAS A GUEST 
IN THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVEN BY MARY ELLEN 
CARTER. 
The issue before the court is: 
Was the plaintiff, Diane Favatella, a seven-
year old child, a guest at the time of injury, inas-
much as her parents 1arranged for the ride for her 
with the defendant driver? 
Section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
reads as follows: 
"Responsibility of owner or driver of a ve-
hicle to a guest. - Any person, who as a guest 
accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon 
any of the public highways of the State of 
Utah, and while so riding as such guest re-
ceives or sustains an injury, shall have no 
right of recovery against the owner or driver 
or person responsible for the operation of such 
vehicle. In the event that such person while 
so riding as such guest is killed, or dies as a 
result of injuries sustained while so riding 
as such guest, then neither the estate nor the 
legal representative or heirs of such guest 
shall have any right of recovery against the 
driver or owner of said vehicle by reason of 
the death of said guest. If such person so 
riding as a giwst be a minor and sustain an 
injury or be killed or die as .a result of injury 
sustained while so riding as such guest, then 
neither the parents nor guardians nor the 
estate nor legal representatives or heirs of 
such minor shall have any right of recovery 
against the driver or: owner ~r pers_on respo_n-
sible for the operation of said vehicle for in-
jury sustained or as a result of the death of 
sucli minor. Nothing in this section shall be 
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construed as relieving the owner or driver or 
person responsible for the operation of a ve-
hicle from liability for injury to or death of 
such guest proximately resulting from the 
intoxication or wilful misconduct of such own-
er, driver or person responsible for the oper-
ation of such vehicle; provided, that in :any 
action for death or for injury or damage to 
person or proper'ty by or on behalf of a guest 
or the estate, heirs or legal representatives of 
such guest, the burden shall be upon plaintiff 
to establish that such intoxication or wilful 
misconduct was the proximate cause of such 
death or injury or damage." 
'Section 41-9-2 defines guest as follows: 
"Guest defined - For the purpose of this 
section, the term 'guest' is hereby defined as 
being a person who accepts a ride in any ve-
hicle without giving compensation therefor." 
In Welker vs. Sorenson (1957) 209 Or. 402, 
306 P. 737, the problem presented in this case is 
discussed in a situation where an action was brought 
for the wrongful death of a twenty-nine-month old 
child, who was a guest passenger at the time of the 
accident. In Welker vs. Sorenson, supra, the court 
rsaid: 
"The identical question, under similar fiacts, 
was presented in Buckner vs. Vetterick, 124 
Cal. App. 2d, 417, 269 P. 2d, 67, 68, and the 
Court held that the child's status was deter-
mined by that of the mother. After referring 
to the policy of the guest statute as explained 
in previous decisions of the California Courts 
it was said: 
·1 
'* * * Thus, under the legislatively de-
clared public policy of this state, the 
mother of plaintiffs, who was injured in 
accident, cannot recover from the de-
fendant. As she had the responsibility 
of their care and direction. It was her 
decision that determined whether they 
should go on this trip. In accepting the 
ride for hersel'f and deciding to take the 
children along, she also accepted for them. 
Otherwise, we would have the anomalous 
situation of the mother who made the 
decision being a guest and her infant 
children not being guests and their sta-
tus with respect to the operator of the 
car being different from that of their 
mother, with the result that during the 
trip the driver would owe a different 
degree of oare to the chil'dren from that 
which she owed to their mother. Such a 
differentiation is both illogical and out 
of harmony with the purpose of Section 
403 of the vehicle code. It would there-
fore seem both reasonable and logical to 
say that when a parent accepts a ride as 
1a guest of the operator and takes along 
her small children, she also accepts the 
ride for them, and they have the same 
status with relation to the driver on 
such ride that the parent has. Therefore, 
since the mother was a guest, the child-
ren were guests, and none of them could 
recover as only simple negligence was in-
volved." 
In Indiana, in Whitfield vs. Bruegel ( 1963) 
134 Ind. App. 636, 190 N.E. 670, where the father 
of a minor child had given a great aunt unrestricted 
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custody of minor child, and where child without per-
mission of father visited great ,aunt and where great 
aunt while operating an automobile drove into a 
parked car and injured the child, the Indiana court, 
sitting, In Banc, rejected the contention the child 
was not a guest because she could not give requisite 
consent and held the child to be a guest. The Court 
said there seemed to be no reason why a natural 
guardian could not accept an invitation for a child 
to take a ride. 
In Horst vs. Holtzen (1958) 149 Iowa, 958, 90 
N.W. 2d, 41, where the mother of the plaintiff, a 
thirteen-day old infant asked the defendant to drive 
her and the plaintiff to a meeting, and the defend-
ant granted such permission, the court held the in-
fant was a guest in the defendant's automobile not-
withstanding the fact that infant might have been 
incapable of accepting an invitation to ride and said 
lower court properly directed a verdict for the de-
fendant. 
In Lynott vs. Sells (1958) 52 Del. 385, 158 A. 
2'd, 583, where a five-year old minor rode with the 
defendant motorist with the infant minor's mother's 
express consent, the court held the infant was not 
excluded from the operation of the automobile guest 
statute as a matter of law. 
In Morgan vs. Anderson (1939) 149, Kan. 814, 
89 P. 2d, 866, where a seven-year old child, left to 
the unrestricted custody of driver, was taken on an 
automobile trip and injured while in vVyoming and 
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where the Wyoming law provided that no person 
transported by the owner or opera:tor of the motor 
vehicle as his guest with out payment for such trans-
portation shall have a cause of action for damages 
against such operator for injury unless such acci-
dent shall be caused by gross negligence or wilful 
or wanton misconduct, the Kansas Court sustained 
a demurrer in favor of the defendant driver dismis-
sing the case as a matter of law. 
And again, in In Re vVrights Estate (1951) 
170 Kan. 600, 228, P. 2d, 911, where a four-year 
old child was left to the unrestricted care and custody 
of child's grandparents, the four-year old child was 
held a guest within the meaning of Kansas guest 
statute, even though incapable of accepting a ride. 
In Letterel vs. Cerniglia (1948) 274 App. Div. 
896, 82 N.Y. 2d, 670, an eleven-year old child ac-
companying her mother and step-father was held a 
guest as a matter of law within the meaning of the 
Ohio guest statute, which provided owner of motor 
vehicles is not liable for injuries to a guest trans-
ported without payment unless injury is caused by 
wilful misconduct. 
In Tilghman vs. Rightor (1947) 211, Ark. 229, 
199, S.W. 2d 943, where three boys, ages seven, nine 
,and fourteen flagged a truck and obtained a ride 
they were held guests within the statute and court 
declared in defining guests the statute made no ex-
ception in favor of minors. 
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In Schlitz vs. Pictor (1938) 66, S.D. 3Ul, 220 
N.W. 2d, 519, a ten-year old boy was held a guest 
within the meaning of the guest statute of South 
Dakota. 
In what may be the Latest California case 
' Buckner vs. Vetterick (19'54) 124 C.A. 2d 417 269 
' ' ' P. 2d, 67, the California Digtrict Court of Appeals 
held children were guests where a mother accepted 
a ride and took her two children, ages fifteen months 
and twenty-six months along. This decision is par-
ticularly important in view of other Ca'lifornia Su-
preme Court holdings to the eff e~t a child of minor 
age is not a guest where the ride was given to the 
child without the consent or permission of the parent. 
In Haarstrich vs. Oregon Shortline Railroad 
Company (1927) 70 U. 552, 26'2 P. 100, where an 
action was brought .against Railroad Corn pany for 
injury sustained by a fifteen-year old girl, injured 
in a crossing collision, and where the fifteen-year 
old girl accepted the invitation of the owner of the 
automobile to ride and where the automobile was 
driven by another with the owner's permission, and 
where it w,as shown that she had no control over 
the operation of the car, this court held that the 
fifteen-year old minor was a guest as a matter of 
law. 
The purpose of guest statutes is to relieve a gen-
erous driver who is sued by an invited rider for 
ordinary negligence of the driver, in a situation 
where the rider gives nothing to compensate for the 
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transportation. Just as a dog should not bite the 
hand which feeds it, a generous driver should not 
be sued by a person who gives nothing by way of 
compensation for the ride. Further, if the purpose 
of the guest law is to be accomplished, it seems that 
the reasoning of the California court in Buckner vs. 
Vetterick, supra, and the Oregon ·court in Welker vs. 
Sorenson, is logical and sound. 
When children are visiting business premises 
with their mother or other custodians, invariably the 
children are held to be business invitees even though 
they have no intention of buying anything for them-
selves and no invitation has been issued to them. 
In that situa:tion, the mother impliedly accepts the 
invitation and if an acceptance is require'd by a 
child riding in a vehicle to be a guest, impliedly, it 
wou.ld seem the acceptance of the parents is suffi-
cient, and since Diane Favatella's parents arranged 
for the ride, an acceptance was made on her behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court should be directed to grant the 
defendant and appellant, M1airy Ellen Carter's Mo-
tion to Dismiss. 
Respectfully subm'i tted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
Attorney for the 
Defendant-Appellant 
1473South11th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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I hereby certify that on this ____________________ day of 
____________________________________ , 1965, I mailed two copies of 
this Brief by United States mail, postage prepa1id, 
to Ernest F. Baldwin, and two copies to Dwight L. 
King, at the addresses shown on this Brief. 
----------------------------------------------------------- .. 
10 
